Edges for Jun 5, 2026

I assess a substantially lower chance than the market that the UK Prime Minister will be the first G7 leader to leave office; I estimate ~22% for the UK PM being first, with Japan's leader (Sanae Takaichi) the single largest individual risk.

I assess a better-than-even chance (60%) that 2026 will look like a genuine ‘bear year’ for Trump — characterized by sustained legal and institutional setbacks, damaging headlines, and meaningful reputational/operational pain — even if it stops short of catastrophic criminal or financial collapse.

Assuming 'Yes' means the *average annual* number of U.S. measles cases across 2025–2028 is at least 1,000, I assign a 72% probability that it will be Yes — I view the large 2026 wave plus systemic policy and global-health disruptions as more likely than not to push the multi-year average above 1,000.

Given Xavier Becerra's statewide name recognition, prior statewide office experience, and likely establishment backing, I assess a better-than-even but not overwhelming chance that he will finish first in the June 2, 2026 California gubernatorial primary.

Given the absence of any known criminal exposure for Barron Trump and the political costs of pardoning a child, I assess a low probability that he will receive a presidential pardon by Jan 21, 2029 — ~8%.

I assess a very low probability (~3%) that Trump will *actually* take back legal/control of the Panama Canal during his term — rhetoric and congressional signaling raise the chance of attempts or threats, but legal, diplomatic and military barriers make a successful transfer extremely unlikely.

I estimate a ~35% chance that the 2026 ‘‘bull case’’ for Trump materializes—meaning he avoids a costly Iran war while convincingly projecting strength and producing measurable market/political tailwinds—because avoiding catastrophic escalation is plausible but achieving the political/economic trifecta is a high bar.

Given the remaining two months and the fact that only one 7-day-average spike at or above 60 is needed, I assess a modestly better-than-even chance that IMF Portwatch will record a 7-day moving average ≥60 for the Strait of Hormuz by July 31, 2026, but significant downside geopolitical and insurance risks keep the probability well below certainty.

I assess a 65% probability that the U.S. will fall below 7.60 on the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index at least once between 2025–2028 under the Trump administration — more likely than not, but far from a foregone conclusion.

Based on the SpaceX IPO reports and Musk’s existing asset base, I assess a strong but not certain chance that Elon Musk becomes the world’s first trillionaire before 2030 — my independent probability is 70%.

Given limited public price data and the short two-day horizon, the outcome is essentially a coin flip; I assess a 50% chance that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 6 will be above $64,000.

**Independent assessment:** I estimate a 75% chance that U.S. federal debt (as used by the official tracker counted for this market) will hit $40 trillion before the Trump administration ends in March 2029 — likely late in the term but not guaranteed.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that the U.S. acquires any part of Greenland before 2029 — most likely through non-sovereign instruments (leases, concessions) rather than a transfer of territory; outright sovereignty transfer is highly unlikely.

I assess a 60% probability that Karen Bass and Nithya Raman will be the two candidates who advance to the November 2026 runoff, driven by incumbency advantage for Bass and a fragmented moderate/centrist field that could allow a progressive like Raman to consolidate second-place support.

I assess a ~30% independent probability that Elon Musk will physically visit Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — higher than the market's 10% Yes price because early crewed Mars missions plus Musk's willingness and control of SpaceX make a pre-2050 trip plausible.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that USAID will be fully eliminated during a Trump term; elimination is possible in extreme political alignments but more likely is heavy restructuring or de-funding rather than statutory abolition.

I assess a 72% chance Elon Musk will be a trillionaire before 2027, driven mainly by a likely SpaceX IPO this year at a valuation high enough to push his paper net worth over $1T, with Tesla moves and small other channels as secondary contributors.

I assess a low likelihood that a formal, comprehensive U.S.–China free trade agreement will be signed and implemented by Jan 20, 2029 — the best estimate is 18% based on political, institutional, and geopolitical barriers.

Very unlikely — I assess a low single-digit chance (~7%) that Trump will successfully purchase any part of Greenland during a presidential term, because of overwhelming legal, political, and diplomatic obstacles despite his past interest.

A U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term is extremely unlikely; I assess ~94% probability that there will be no acquisition and only a small tail for improbable purchase deals in various price bands.

I assess a ~20% independent probability that Scottie Scheffler will complete a career grand slam before 2028. This is materially higher than the current market price (6%), largely because Scheffler's elite win-rate per major and the number of remaining opportunities make the event plausibly likely enough to be mispriced by the market.

I assess about a 30% chance that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of transit calls for the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 on at least one day by June 30, 2026, reflecting a modest chance of rapid recovery or a short-lived surge but a greater likelihood that disruptions and time constraints will prevent a sustained rebound.

I assess an 18% independent probability that Justice Clarence Thomas will resign during President Trump's term. This reflects his demonstrated longevity, lack of public signals to step down, and the distinction between resignation and other endpoints (illness/death).

Independent assessment: there is a meaningful but still-subdued chance Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act before 2027-01-01; I place that probability at 28%, higher than the market's 16% because of his rhetorical willingness and plausible triggers, but tempered by high legal, institutional, and political barriers.

I assess a low probability that Trump will be impeached and convicted (removed) before his term ends — roughly an 8% chance — because removal requires a bipartisan two‑thirds Senate conviction, a threshold that is historically unprecedented and politically unlikely absent an extraordinary, unifying scandal.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that President Trump will *voluntarily announce* his resignation before Jan 21, 2029 — my independent estimate is 12%.

I assess a 30% chance Blake Lively will attend Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce’s wedding on 2028-12-31. Current reporting that she was not invited makes attendance unlikely, but the long time horizon and the parties' prior closeness leave meaningful upside for reconciliation.

I assess roughly a 51% chance that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029 — slightly more likely than not, driven mainly by the 2026 House midterms and the high probability of a Democratic majority enabling an impeachment vote if a compelling catalyst appears.

I assign a 40% probability that any U.S. quarterly GDP print will exceed an annualized 5% at least once between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028. Strong policy-driven or inventory-driven surges could get there, but structural constraints and likely Fed responses make a >5% quarter more unlikely than the current market price implies.

I assess a high but not certain chance that Conor McGregor will have a next UFC fight before 2028 (about 80%); among named contenders, Max Holloway is the standalone favorite but I assign him a ~60% chance — materially lower than the market’s 91% concentration on Holloway.

I assess a 28% chance that U.S. federal government spending (measured as annual federal outlays) will register a nominal decrease of $250 billion or more in a single year before 2028.

I assess ~40% probability the Chicago team will officially announce a relocation to a new Illinois location by the 2028 opener — Indiana (Hammond) is the single more likely destination given a signed stadium authority and faster funding certainty.

Abolition is possible but unlikely — I assess a 12% chance that the Department of Education will be legally eliminated before Jan 20, 2029; a far more likely outcome is aggressive dismantling without full statutory abolition.

I assess a very low likelihood that the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029 — estimated probability 2% — because legal, political, and diplomatic barriers make any sovereign transfer or effective takeover extremely unlikely in peacetime.

I assess Marine Le Pen's chance of winning the 2027 French presidential election at about 15%, meaning a low but non-negligible possibility driven by France's polarized politics and potential vote fragmentation, while structural barriers and the historic anti-extremist coalition make her victory unlikely.

Given limited public information and current market-implied odds near 46.5% Yes, I assess a below-even chance that Hyperliquid will reach $100 by the end of 2026 because the outcome requires either a large token-specific catalyst or a broad crypto bull market that outperforms current expectations.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026; about a 10% probability driven by the possibility of a rapid risk-on turn or massive inflows but constrained by macro, regulatory, and time-limiting factors.

Given the market-implied confidence and typical short-term behavior of Bitcoin, I assess a high probability that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 11 will be above $54,000, but tail risks from minute-level volatility and exchange microstructure prevent a near-certain call.

Given the market's near-certainty but limited public reporting, I assess a strong but not absolute probability that Graham Platner will win the Maine Democratic Senate primary, reflecting likely establishment support or lack of a credible challenger but leaving room for late developments.

I assess a low probability (10%) that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls >= 60 on any date through June 15, 2026, because the short time window and need for a sustained surge in daily transits make a rebound unlikely, though a rapid de-escalation or sudden rerouting back through Hormuz could produce an outsized jump.

I assess a 45% probability that Russia and Ukraine will reach a mutually agreed, general ceasefire by 11:59 PM ET on December 31, 2026, because political and economic incentives for a deal are real but entrenched strategic and domestic obstacles make such an agreement more likely to be delayed or fragile than decisive within the stated timeframe.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, largely because of his persistent influence in the party but tempered by legal, health, and competitive obstacles.

I assess that Karen Bass has a strong but not certain chance to win the 2026 Los Angeles mayoral election, with a probability of 72% driven primarily by incumbency, fundraising, and the city's Democratic tilt, tempered by persistent governance challenges and turnout uncertainty.

I assign an 8% probability that Ethereum will reach $2,500 at any time in June; the market price (2.65%) implies an extremely low chance, but historical volatility and rare catalysts make a modestly higher tail probability plausible.

Given Netanyahu's durable electoral base and superior coalition-building experience but significant legal and political headwinds, I assess a below-even but non-negligible chance he will be sworn in as Prime Minister after the next election.

Given limited recent data and the Fed's historically data-dependent posture after a tightening cycle, I assess a modest but below-even probability that the Fed will raise the upper bound of the federal funds rate at any time in 2026; the risks that would force a hike exist but are not the baseline.

OpenAI is substantially more likely to IPO before Anthropic between now and 2040, but not certain — I assess ~72% probability that OpenAI will be first.

I assess a 68% chance that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 8 will be above $62,000, slightly higher than the market-implied probability due to the single-minute resolution and recent structural bid-support in the market.