Edges for Jul 8, 2026

Independent assessment: very unlikely that Justice Samuel Alito will resign during Trump's 2025–2029 term; I estimate an 8% chance he voluntarily resigns during that window.

I assess a moderately high probability that Trump will say the words "Million," "Billion," or "Trillion" 20+ times during the Turkey press conference, mainly because of his documented habit of repeating numeric magnitudes and the likelihood he will pivot to domestic economic talking points during Q&A.

**Assumption:** 'Yes' = OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic. Independent assessment: I assign a 35% probability that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic (i.e., Anthropic is more likely to be the first of the two to list).

I assess a low probability (~15%) that the Fed will cut by more than 25 bps at the December 8, 2027 meeting; a modest cut of 25 bps or no change are substantially more likely given current trajectories and Fed behavior.

Independent assessment: Barron Trump is very unlikely to be pardoned before Jan 21, 2029 — I estimate about a 5% chance, driven mainly by lack of any federal charges and the enormous political cost of pardoning one’s own child.

Based on current outbreak trajectory and likely vaccination/epidemiological dynamics, I assess a high probability that the measured average number of US measles cases during 2025–2028 will meet the market's 'Yes' condition (see assumptions below). My independent probability: 72%.

I assess a low probability that Donald Trump will publicly praise Zohran Mamdani by July 31, assigning a 12% chance based on Mamdani's low national profile and ideological mismatch with Trump balanced against a small possibility of tactical or sarcastic praise.

Given multiple independently verifiable setbacks (Supreme Court ruling, large-scale environmental rollbacks that provoke backlash, and documented election-subversion plans already generating litigation), I assess a substantial chance the bear-case narrative will materialize in 2026 — but Trump's structural political resilience limits certainty.

I assess a low probability (18%) that U.S. real quarterly GDP will exceed 5% in any quarter from Q1 2025–Q4 2028; consensus forecasts and structural constraints make such a spike unlikely absent a large fiscal or one-off statistical shock.

I assess a substantially below-even chance that a new, WHO-declared pandemic will occur before Grand Theft Auto VI is released, with current conditions, surveillance, and historical frequency favoring a No outcome over the likely release window.

I assess a 50% independent probability that Todd Blanche will be confirmed as Trump’s next Attorney General; Lee Zeldin is the most plausible alternative at ~30% with DeSantis, Bailey, and Paxton trailing as lower-probability outcomes.

I assess a very low probability that Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal by physically seizing or legally reasserting US sovereign control during his term — this is overwhelmingly unlikely given legal, diplomatic, operational, and geopolitical constraints.

I estimate a ~32% chance Scottie Scheffler wins the U.S. Open before 2028 and thereby completes the career Grand Slam, driven by elite form and two remaining realistic attempts (2026 and 2027).

Based on the Q1 FY2026 baseline (41,118) and announced plans (600–650 additional openings), I estimate a modest but meaningful chance that Starbucks will report >41,800 global stores in 2026 — my independent probability is 35%.

I assess a 60% chance NYC's population will rise by a small amount (0.01%–0.99%) from July 2025 to July 2027: a narrow, immigration-driven recovery is the most plausible outcome, but sensitive to migration policy and domestic outflows.

I assess a modest but material chance that the Fed’s upper bound reaches 5.0%+ by the end of 2026, driven by upside inflation shocks or a much hotter-than-expected labor market, with a baseline probability of 25%. Markets currently price this outcome as extremely unlikely, but history and policy uncertainty keep a meaningful tail risk alive.

I assign Google a 28% chance of occupying second place on the Chatbot Arena Text Arena | Overall leaderboard at the July 31, 2026 12:00 PM ET check, higher than the current market price but reflecting substantial competition and leaderboard volatility.

I assess a 25% chance that JD Vance will say the word "Trump" 15 or more times during his Milwaukee remarks; it is plausible only if the event is a high-energy, pro-Trump rally or if Vance repeatedly invokes Trump in introductions and applause lines, otherwise it is unlikely.

I assess a 45% chance that OpenSea's token will have a Fully Diluted Valuation above $500M one day after launch, reflecting meaningful upside from brand and demand but substantial uncertainty from tokenomics, timing, and macro/regulatory risks.

Independent assessment: Jay Clayton is the most likely permanent DNI but not a lock — I assign him a ~65% chance of being confirmed before Jan 20, 2029, with several plausible alternate outcomes (including an eventual Pulte push or another Trump loyalist) accounting for the rest.

I assess that there is a better-than-even chance the next xAI Grok model will debut with a score of at least 1440 on the Arena.ai Text Overall leaderboard before 2027-01-01, but the outcome is not guaranteed due to timing, naming, and evaluation risks.

Given an aggravated murder charge and the incentives for prosecutors to secure a homicide conviction within the next 13 months, I assess a slightly better-than-even chance that Tyler Robinson will be convicted of a criminal homicide offense by July 31, 2027.

United Russia is the most likely party to gain the most seats in the 2026 State Duma election due to entrenched incumbency advantages and control over electoral administration, although economic and wartime pressures create nontrivial downside risks.

I assess a 30% probability that Ethereum will reach $3,000 by December 31, 2026, reflecting meaningful upside under a crypto-friendly macro and regulatory environment but significant downside risk from tightening macro conditions and regulatory uncertainty.

I assess a low independent probability—about **7%**—that the United States will acquire any sovereign part of Greenland before 2029; the logistical, legal, and political barriers make transfer of sovereignty far more likely to fail than succeed.

I assess a low probability (12%) that USAID will be legally eliminated during Trump's current term; a far more likely outcome is deep defunding, functional transfer or rebranding rather than statutory abolition.

I assess a low probability that Trump will finalize a comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) with China before Jan 20, 2029 — roughly a 12% chance — because of ideological resistance, institutional obstacles, and the political cost of such a deal.

I assess a very low probability (3%) that Trump will successfully buy any part of Greenland during his term. Legal sovereignty, Greenlandic/Danish political opposition, and huge fiscal and diplomatic costs make a purchase essentially implausible; the market (Yes 18%) appears to overstate the chance.

I assess a strong but not certain likelihood that Alibaba will top the Chatbot Arena 'Text Arena | Overall' leaderboard among Chinese companies on July 31, 2026, based on its historical model quality, engineering resources, and likely presence on the Arena, tempered by competitive release risk from Baidu, Tencent, and ByteDance and platform-specific uncertainties.

I assess a 58% probability that the Bank of Russia will cut the key rate at its July 24, 2026 meeting, with a small-to-moderate easing more likely than no change given the balance of macro pressures but meaningful risks that could keep policy on hold.

I assess a 70% probability that Evil Dead Burn will open under $20M domestically, reflecting a combination of competitive summer scheduling, genre patterns, and uncertainty about marketing and early demand.

I assess a 30% chance that Brown-Forman will have an announced acquisition agreement by December 31, 2026, with the most important constraints being entrenched family control and a high headline price tag despite strong strategic appeal to large spirits players and financial buyers.

I assess a 70% probability that the next OpenAI GPT model added to the Arena.ai Text Arena leaderboard will debut at a score of at least 1480 by December 31, 2026, balancing OpenAI's historical progress and engineering resources against platform and timing risks.

I assess an 85% probability that Abiy Ahmed will officially assume the office of Prime Minister of Ethiopia following the June 1, 2026 general election, with the largest remaining risks coming from security escalation, internal elite splits, or a chaotic post-election transition.

I assess a 52% probability that Jannik Sinner wins Wimbledon 2026, viewing him as a clear favorite based on talent and trajectory but accounting for strong competition on grass and situational uncertainties.

Market sentiment strongly favors Bryce (market-implied ~84.5%), but show dynamics and midseason volatility justify a more conservative assessed probability of 72% that Bryce Dettloff will be one of the male winners of Love Island USA Season 8.

Independent assessment: extremely likely (95%) there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term — purchase or transfer of sovereignty is effectively blocked by Danish and Greenlandic opposition, legal constraints, and geopolitical costs.

Given the strong market conviction that The Odyssey will exceed $75M, the summer release window, and typical studio behavior, I assess a 20% chance the opening weekend will be under $75M domestically.

Netanyahu is a serious contender to be sworn in as Prime Minister after the October 27, 2026 election due to his durable personal following and Likud's structural advantages, but significant legal, political, and coalition risks make his path uncertain; I assess a 48% probability he will be next PM.

Nigel Farage is likely to retain Clacton but not certain; I assess a strong but not overwhelming chance that he wins the by-election, with an estimated probability of 78%.

I assess a 36% chance that 2026 will be the hottest year on record according to the NASA GISTEMP No_Smoothing annual value, slightly higher than the current market-implied probability because long-term warming and episodic extremes keep the tail risk of a record elevated despite ENSO uncertainty.

I assess a low probability that Tesla and SpaceX will officially announce a merger or acquisition by December 31, 2026, because of serious regulatory, investor, and financing obstacles despite Elon Musk’s influence and precedent for cross-company deals.

I assess a 12% probability that June 2026 annual CPI will be 3.6% or lower; most indicators point to headline inflation remaining above 3.6% but there is a non-negligible chance that continued disinflation and helpful base effects push the 12-month reading beneath that threshold.

Given explicit statements of willingness, active internal planning, and recent favorable legal signals for executive insulation, I assign a meaningful but not dominant chance that Trump will formally invoke the Insurrection Act during his presidency: **30%**.

I assess an 18% chance the 25th Amendment will be invoked at least once during President Trump’s current term — a low but non‑negligible probability driven largely by age/health risk; political and institutional barriers make formal removal unlikely.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (~20%) that Google will occupy the top spot on Chatbot Arena's LLM leaderboard on July 31, 2026, because Google has the resources to leapfrog competitors but faces short-term disadvantages from competitor momentum, evaluation biases, and timing uncertainty.

I assess a low but non‑negligible independent probability (9%) that Donald Trump will be impeached and removed from office before Jan 20, 2029. Structural barriers — most importantly the need for a 2/3 Senate conviction — make removal unlikely, though dramatic, bipartisan-triggering events could produce a small tail chance.

I assess a low but material chance that the full 2026 'Trump bull case' materializes — primarily because a dovish Fed or a sustained AI mega-cap rally could produce a concentrated upside, but current macro, crypto, and valuation headwinds make that outcome unlikely.

I assess a strong likelihood that Donald Trump will attend the 2026 World Cup Final given its location in New Jersey, his past behavior around high-profile events, and the low logistical barriers, but legal or scheduling conflicts keep the probability below the market-implied 91.5%.

Keith Sonderling is the clear favorite to be Trump’s next Secretary of Labor due to his formal nomination and incumbency as Acting Secretary; I assess this outcome as likely but not certain because Senate confirmation could still fail or be delayed.

I assess a 15% chance that Donald Trump attends zero 2026 World Cup matches, because the tournament's U.S.-centric schedule and his history of seeking high-visibility appearances make at least one appearance more likely, but campaign, legal, health, and security constraints leave a meaningful chance he attends none.

I assess a modestly better-than-even chance (~52%) that the Chicago pro football team will announce relocation to a new stadium site in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 regular season — the outcome hinges on whether Illinois lawmakers can clinch a financing deal before the club finalizes a move to Indiana.

I assess a low probability that Zelenskyy and Putin will meet before 1 Jan 2027 — about a 20% chance — because Putin has publicly refused and there is no confirmed plan, though active third‑party mediation keeps a nontrivial tail risk of a surprise meeting.

I assess a high probability that Marine Le Pen will be the National Rally’s 2027 presidential candidate, though there is a meaningful chance the party opts for a younger leader (e.g., Jordan Bardella) or delays a formal single-name endorsement.

I assess a very small probability that the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029 — this is a low‑single‑digit tail event driven chiefly by extreme, highly unlikely scenarios (war, forcible seizure, or a negotiated cession of territory under extraordinary political pressure).

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (12%) that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of transit calls for the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 on or before July 31, 2026; the short remaining window and persistent security, insurance, and routing frictions make recovery to 'normal' within three weeks unlikely but not impossible if a rapid de-escalation or data revision occurs.

I assess a ~20% chance Elon Musk himself visits Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — non-negligible because of early-window possibilities (2030s–2060s) and Musk’s resources, but low because of mortality, medical risk, and lack of any declared personal plan.

I assess a low probability (12%) that China will overtake U.S. GDP on a *nominal* basis by 1 January 2030; China already leads on PPP but the nominal overtake in the next ~3.5 years is unlikely without very large currency revaluation or extreme shocks to U.S. output.

Assuming '250' means a $250 billion or greater reduction in annual federal outlays by the end of 2027, I assess ~22% probability that government spending will fall by that magnitude before 2028.

I assess an 8% chance that any company will publicly announce a credible claim of having achieved AGI before 2027-01-01; the deadline is short, verification hurdles are high, and expert consensus points to a later timeframe.