Who will be the next Prime Minister of Israel after the next election?
Netanyahu is a serious contender to be sworn in as Prime Minister after the October 27, 2026 election due to his durable personal following and Likud's structural advantages, but significant legal, political, and coalition risks make his path uncertain; I assess a 48% probability he will be next PM.
Analysis
The October 27, 2026 election is scheduled to determine who will be sworn in as Prime Minister, and Israel's proportional system means the post-election horse-trading over coalition formation is the decisive stage for who actually takes office. Netanyahu has repeatedly demonstrated resilience across decades of Israeli politics, retaining an organized party machine, a disciplined voting base, institutional familiarity with coalition bargaining, and a strong branding on security issues; those structural advantages make him a perennial front-runner even when popular support ebbs. At the same time, his legal entanglements and the large anti-Netanyahu constituency that has repeatedly coalesced in the past create a persistent counterweight: a unified or tactically arranged anti-Netanyahu bloc could deny him the coalition majority even if Likud is the largest party. Because resolution depends on who is sworn in, not who wins the most Knesset seats, coalition arithmetic, alliance durability, and any post-election legal or parliamentary maneuvers will be crucial for the final outcome.
Coalition dynamics and fragmentation are the most important practical constraints on Netanyahu's prospects. Israel's multi-party system tends to produce a highly fragmented Knesset in which even the largest party frequently needs multiple partners to achieve 61 seats; this amplifies the bargaining power of smaller parties and can force a prime ministerial candidate to make concessions or step aside for a compromise figure. If Netanyahu can assemble a comfortable right-leaning coalition including religious and nationalist partners without provoking defections, his chances rise sharply; conversely, if centrist and moderate parties are willing to coalesce and trade positions to form a viable anti-Netanyahu majority, he may be blocked despite a strong personal vote. The presence of potential kingmakers within the right (or defections within Likud) also creates a material chance that another right-leaning leader could be the compromise PM even if Netanyahu remains a dominant party figure.
External shocks and legal-institutional developments will materially affect voter behavior and coalition choices between now and the election. Security incidents, economic shocks, or significant geopolitical moves (e.g., normalization deals, shifts in US-Israel relations) tend to boost leadership perceived as experienced or tough on security, which favors Netanyahu; by contrast, sustained mass protest movements, credible legal rulings that curtail his ability to serve, or high-profile defections could quickly erode his bargaining power. Market pricing currently implies roughly a 35.5% chance, showing the market assigns substantial downside risk to his path; my independent assessment raises that to 48% because I weight his organizational strengths and the typical incumbency/experience advantage more heavily, while still accounting for substantial event-specific risks and coalition fragility that keep the probability well below coin-flip certainty.
Finally, historical patterns in Israeli politics favor iterative uncertainty: past elections have often led to protracted negotiations, unexpected coalition configurations, and last-minute deals; this history argues against treating early polling or headline seat estimates as definitive. Given the combination of Netanyahu's durable base, Likud's likely centrality in any right-oriented bloc, and the high sensitivity of outcomes to post-election bargaining and legal developments, the midrange probability is that Netanyahu ends up sworn in, but not with high certainty—hence the 48% forecast that reflects both structural upside and meaningful downside contingencies.
Arguments
For
- Netanyahu has a durable personal following and an experienced party machine that consistently converts votes into seats.
- His track record on security and foreign policy can attract swing voters during periods of heightened security concern.
- Likud historically performs well in fragmented parliaments, making it likely to be a central coalition player after the election.
- Netanyahu’s deep relationships with right-leaning religious and nationalist parties increase his odds of assembling a majority.
- As a veteran leader he has practiced coalition bargaining many times and can make effective tradeoffs to secure partners.
- International ties and perceived leadership continuity can reassure some domestic voters and potential coalition partners.
Against
- Ongoing legal cases and convictions create both formal and reputational impediments to his appointment and swearing-in.
- Large and motivated anti-Netanyahu blocs have previously succeeded in coordinating to block or weaken him, and they could do so again.
- Coalitions reliant on small extreme partners are inherently unstable and could collapse before or during formation.
- Key centrist parties may prefer to back an alternative compromise candidate rather than enable Netanyahu to return.
- International diplomatic pressure or conditionality could make some partners reluctant to sign onto a Netanyahu-led government.
- Voter fatigue and protest mobilization against Netanyahu’s long tenure could depress his vote share below a viable threshold.
Key drivers
- Netanyahu's personal vote share and Likud's raw seat count on election night will determine whether he can plausibly lead initial coalition talks.
- Coalition arithmetic among small religious, nationalist, and centrist parties will decide whether a stable majority supporting Netanyahu is feasible.
- The legal status of Netanyahu (ongoing trials, convictions, or new legislation) can either disqualify him, reduce his bargaining power, or mobilize supporters depending on developments.
- Security developments or major geopolitical events between now and the election can shift public sentiment sharply in favor of or against experienced leaders.
- Intra-Likud unity and the presence or absence of high-profile defections will influence whether Netanyahu can credibly command a coalition.
- Strategic moves by centrist or anti-Netanyahu leaders to coordinate lists or seat-sharing agreements could create a blocking majority.
- International pressure or conditionality from key allies may shape coalition partners' willingness to back Netanyahu.
- Post-election horse-trading norms and precedent for compromise prime ministerial arrangements will affect the likelihood that Netanyahu personally is sworn in.
Risk factors
- A unified anti-Netanyahu coalition or effective tactical seat-sharing among opponents could prevent him from forming a majority.
- Adverse legal rulings or an enforced legal bar could render him ineligible or politically untenable as a prospective prime minister.
- Severe internal splits within Likud or major defections could leave him without the party control needed to be the coalition leader.
- A major political scandal, economic shock, or a security event that shifts public outrage away from incumbency could reduce his support.
- Electoral threshold shifts or new party entrants could change seat distributions in ways that disadvantage Likud’s coalition-building capacity.
- International diplomatic isolation or conditional aid pressures could make potential coalition partners worry about the costs of backing Netanyahu.
- Unexpected health issues or voluntary retirement from Netanyahu would immediately change the universe of possible PMs.
- Prolonged deadlock after the election could produce a compromise candidate who is not Netanyahu despite his party’s strength.
Scenarios
Best case
Netanyahu leads Likud to a clear plurality, quickly secures commitments from religious and nationalist partners, navigates legal obstacles without disqualification, and is formally sworn in as Prime Minister shortly after the election.
Most likely
The election produces a fragmented Knesset with Likud as one of the largest parties; intensive post-election negotiations leave Netanyahu with roughly equal odds to secure a coalition majority, resulting in a close outcome where he is slightly less likely than not to be sworn in, consistent with the assessed ~48% probability.
Worst case
Legal rulings or a cohesive anti-Netanyahu coalition prevent him from being part of the governing majority and a centrist or alternative right leader is appointed and sworn in, or protracted deadlock results in a compromise 'Other' being chosen.
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