Edges for May 31, 2026

I assess a substantially below-market probability that headline CPI will exceed 4% in any month of 2026; the baseline is continued disinflation with meaningful upside-tail risks from energy, supply shocks, or sudden demand acceleration.

Independent view: the UK Prime Minister is unlikely to be the next G7 leader to leave — other leaders (notably Emmanuel Macron and Italy's Giorgia Meloni) carry higher short-to-medium term exit risk. I assign the UK PM a substantially lower probability than the current market.

I assess ~70% chance that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic. OpenAI shows clearer preparatory work, stronger near-term monetization paths, and investor incentives to pursue a public listing sooner than Anthropic.

I assess a better-than-even (but far from certain) chance that Elon Musk will be the world’s first trillionaire by Jan 1, 2030 — most likely driven by a high-valuation SpaceX float or re-rating, but significant execution, timing and tax risks remain.

Independent view: the AI-led, market-driven 'bull case for Trump' in 2026 is plausible but far from likely — I assess a 36% chance that the bull case materializes during 2026.

I assign a low probability (7%) that Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal during his term. Rhetoric and pressure are plausible, but an actual forcible or formal transfer of control is extremely unlikely given legal, diplomatic, operational, and political constraints.

Musk is highly likely but not certain to cross the trillionaire threshold before 2027; I assess a 65% independent probability driven mainly by a potential SpaceX IPO and Tesla upside, but meaningful timing and execution risks remain.

I assess Aaron Lukas has the strongest path to be Trump's next permanent DNI — I assign him a 50% chance, far above the market's 27%, because acting incumbency, inside access, and lower confirmation friction make him the most likely durable choice.

Given the short time remaining, lack of public reporting of a diplomatic breakthrough, and the political incentives to maintain leverage, I assess a low but non-negligible chance that President Trump will officially announce the blockade has been lifted by May 31, 2026.

I assess a roughly 30% chance that the 'bear case' for Trump — a sustained cluster of legal, congressional, economic, and public-opinion setbacks — will materialize in 2026. The May 2026 federal-court defeats increase the plausibility, but structural resiliencies and political dynamics make a full-blown bear year more unlikely than not.

Given Trump's persistent base strength but very substantial legal, health, and intra-party barriers and the current market pricing, I assess a modest but non-negligible chance that Donald Trump will be the 2028 Republican nominee, with a central estimate of 18%. This reflects recognition of his unique political assets tempered by practical obstacles that make his nomination improbable but plausible.

I assess an 18% chance the U.S. will acquire or officially announce acquisition of any part of Greenland before 2029. Strong presidential rhetoric raises the chance of an *announcement*, but legal/political obstacles and clear Danish/Greenlandic opposition make an actual transfer unlikely within the time window.

Given the two-month window and the relatively modest threshold (7-day average >= 60), I assess a better-than-even chance that transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz will meet or exceed 60 by July 31, 2026, assuming no large new security shock; I estimate a 62% probability for Yes.

I assess a very high probability that there will be NO U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term — this is overwhelmingly the expected outcome given legal, political, and practical barriers.

I assess a 25% chance Clarence Thomas will resign (i.e., leave the Court voluntarily) during Trump's 2025–2029 term. He remains active with no announced plan to leave, so a resignation is possible but not the base-case outcome.

I assess a low probability (8%) that Trump will actually buy at least part of Greenland during a term ending by Jan 20, 2029. Rhetoric and strategic pressure make headlines likely, but legal, political, and practical barriers make a genuine purchase unlikely.

I assess a 20% probability that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls equal to or above 60 on any date up to June 15, 2026, because the short time window and need for a sustained rebound work against recovery, though a modest chance exists from rapid de-escalation or operational fixes.

I assess a ~25% independent probability that USAID will be eliminated during a Trump term (through formal abolition or functional absorption). The agency faces real political risk but strong institutional inertia and statutory protections make outright elimination unlikely.

I assess a very low probability that the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029: about 1%. Acquisition would require extraordinary legal, political, or military steps that are not credibly underway and are extremely unlikely to occur even under adversarial U.S.–Canada relations.

I assess a low probability (~10%) that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 2030 — the math of current GDP gaps, plausible growth/FX paths, and structural headwinds make a 2030 crossover unlikely.

Given the lack of recent public information and the market-implied 36% probability, I assess a 30% chance that Hyperliquid will reach $100 by December 31, 2026, because reaching that level within the available time requires strong macro tailwinds, meaningful token supply dynamics, or major positive catalysts that currently are not evident.

I assess a 30% chance that the Department of Education (ED) will be formally abolished by Jan 20, 2029. Active dismantling increases the risk, but statutory, legal, logistical, and political barriers keep abolition unlikely but plausible.

I assess a 68% chance that the U.S. Economist Democracy Index score will fall below 7.60 at least once during the Trump administration (2025–2028). The risk is material because of repeated executive assaults on democratic norms, but institutional resilience and the EIU's annual, conservative scoring temper the probability below the current market price.

I assess a high probability that U.S. federal debt will top $40 trillion at least once during Q4 2024–Q4 2028; I estimate this chance at 87% based on current debt levels, persistently large deficits, enacted tax/spending changes, and likely continued net borrowing through 2028.

Given the structural advantages of incumbency, fundraising and name recognition, I assess Karen Bass as the clear favorite to win the 2026 Los Angeles mayoral election, though a competitive race or runoff remains plausible.

Independent estimate: low probability. Given the very high bar for removal (a 2/3 Senate conviction) and strong historical reluctance of senators to remove a president from office, I assess a modest chance that Trump will be both impeached and removed before his term ends.

**Independent assessment:** Given the plausible range of House outcomes in 2026 and the elevated legal and political risk around President Trump, I assess a better-than-even chance that he will be *impeached* before Jan 20, 2029.

Given the very short time horizon and the large market-cap gaps that typically separate the global top companies, I estimate a low but non-negligible chance that NVIDIA will be the world’s third-largest company by market cap on June 30, 2026.

Given the extremely short timeline, absence of public reporting of a finalized deal, and strong domestic and allied political resistance, I assess a low probability that President Trump will publicly agree to accept Iran's continued uranium enrichment by the May 31 resolution deadline.

I assess Todd Blanche as the most likely nominee to be Trump’s next Attorney General (independent probability 46%), with Lee Zeldin a distant but credible alternative and the other listed names substantially less likely.

I assess a high probability that the Fed will leave the upper bound of the target federal funds rate unchanged at the July 28–29, 2026 FOMC meeting, though not as high as the market-implied 91.5% and with non-negligible tail risk for a 25 bp move if incoming data or financial conditions shift sharply.

I estimate a modestly better-than-even chance that at least one U.S. quarterly real GDP print will exceed 5% (annualized) sometime in Q1 2025–Q4 2028 — my independent probability is 58%. This reflects the multi-quarter window, the possibility of fiscal or inventory-driven spikes, and the asymmetric ways big shocks can produce outsized quarterly rebounds.

I estimate a 40% probability that the market's “Yes” outcome will resolve; this reflects a moderate chance of sustained or increased measles incidence in the U.S. across 2025–2028 driven by global resurgence and domestic undervaccination pockets, tempered by public-health countermeasures and uncertainty about the market's exact resolution criteria.

I estimate a 12% probability that Marine Le Pen will win the 2027 French presidential election, higher than the current market-implied ~5.5% but still low because France's two-round system and broad non-RN coalitions make a Le Pen victory difficult absent major political realignment or crises.

I assess a modestly improved chance relative to the market that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel's next Prime Minister after the scheduled 27 October 2026 election, but the outcome remains highly uncertain and contingent on legal, coalition, and security developments.

Independent estimate: James Ho is a plausible front‑runner but not the favorite — I assess a 22% chance he will be the next Supreme Court justice by Jan 20, 2029, because he combines strong conservative credentials and confirmability advantages but faces a low overall vacancy certainty and stiff competition.

Very unlikely — ending the Federal Reserve would require statute, broad congressional cooperation, and would provoke major legal, market, and political pushback; I assess a low single-digit chance (~4%) that Trump will successfully end the Fed before Jan 20, 2029.

NVIDIA has a modest but limited chance of being the world’s second-largest company by market cap on June 30, 2026; I assess this probability at 12% based on current market structure, Nvidia’s momentum, and the large market-cap cushions of incumbents.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Ethereum reaches $10,000 by Dec 31, 2026; this requires a very large crypto market rally or dramatic ETH-specific demand shock, so I put the probability at 8%.

Given the broad definition of 'Cabinet' but the very short time window and historical rarity of cabinet impeachments, I assess a low but non-negligible chance that the House will impeach a cabinet member before July 1, 2026.

**Independent assessment:** I estimate a roughly one‑in‑three chance (33%) that the 25th Amendment will be invoked at least once during President Trump’s current term — most likely via a voluntary Section 3 transfer for a medical procedure or brief incapacity, far less likely via the contested Section 4 route.

Independent view: Very likely Conor McGregor will fight again before 2028 (high confidence). Max Holloway is the single most probable opponent, but the market overweights Holloway to the exclusion of plausible alternatives such as Justin Gaethje.

I assess an 8% chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026, because a rapid, large rally is possible but requires a confluence of strong, short-timeline catalysts against substantial macro and regulatory headwinds.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that the Fed’s upper bound reaches 5.0%+ by the end of 2026, because prevailing macro trends favor lower or stable rates but acute upside shocks could force several rapid hikes.

I assess a low probability that the PRC will explicitly announce that mainland citizens may legally buy Bitcoin with yuan by Dec 31, 2026; the core drivers that enable an unban are outweighed by entrenched political and financial-control priorities.

I assess a 78% probability that the Strait of Hormuz will see a 7-day moving average of transit calls at or above 60 at least once by December 31, 2026, because baseline traffic levels and commercial incentives favor a return to pre-disruption volumes absent sustained major escalation, while geopolitical flare-ups and insurance/routing shifts remain the primary downside risks.

I assess a low probability that the U.S. will formally acquire any new territory before Jan 1, 2027 — major legal, political, and diplomatic obstacles make a sovereignty transfer within ~7 months unlikely, though rare edge scenarios (Greenland, a tiny island purchase, or crisis-driven seizure) keep it above zero.

I assess ~40% independent probability that the next President will confirm exactly one Supreme Court justice during the 2025–2029 term — most likely there will be one or two confirmations, with a nontrivial chance of none or multiple vacancies.

I assess a low probability that Tesla and xAI will announce a merger/acquisition by June 30, 2026, because while a small-scale acquisition by Tesla is feasible, the short timeframe, governance complexity, and lack of public signals make an announcement unlikely.