Edges for May 30, 2026

I assess ~70% chance that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic. OpenAI shows clearer preparatory work, stronger near-term monetization paths, and investor incentives to pursue a public listing sooner than Anthropic.

I assess a 70% probability that the market's 'Yes' outcome occurs — the very large 2026 measles burden (1,952 confirmed as of May 21) creates a high baseline that makes a high multi-year average considerably more likely than markets currently price.

I estimate a substantially lower chance than the market that the UK Prime Minister (Keir Starmer) will be the first G7 leader to leave; I put that probability at 40% and allocate the rest to other vulnerable leaders (Italy, France, Germany, Japan).

I assess a better-than-even (but far from certain) chance that Elon Musk will be the world’s first trillionaire by Jan 1, 2030 — most likely driven by a high-valuation SpaceX float or re-rating, but significant execution, timing and tax risks remain.

I assign a low probability (7%) that Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal during his term. Rhetoric and pressure are plausible, but an actual forcible or formal transfer of control is extremely unlikely given legal, diplomatic, operational, and political constraints.

Musk is highly likely but not certain to cross the trillionaire threshold before 2027; I assess a 65% independent probability driven mainly by a potential SpaceX IPO and Tesla upside, but meaningful timing and execution risks remain.

I assess a materially higher-than-market chance that a credible ‘bear case’ for Trump will manifest in 2026 — about one-in-three — driven by macro downside plus governance/policy shocks, though the scenario requires a confluence of events rather than a single, obvious trigger.

I assign a 25% chance that Trump will complete a comprehensive U.S.–China free trade agreement (FTA) before Jan 20, 2029. The balance of evidence points to incremental, transactional deals rather than a treaty-level FTA; an FTA would require major political and institutional shifts or a strong catalyst to materialize.

I assess an 18% chance the U.S. will acquire or officially announce acquisition of any part of Greenland before 2029. Strong presidential rhetoric raises the chance of an *announcement*, but legal/political obstacles and clear Danish/Greenlandic opposition make an actual transfer unlikely within the time window.

I assess a very high probability that there will be NO U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term — this is overwhelmingly the expected outcome given legal, political, and practical barriers.

Aaron Lukas is the frontrunner to become Trump’s permanent DNI because he’s already installed as acting and was publicly named by Trump; I assign him a plurality but not certainty given Trump’s prior pattern of choosing higher-profile political allies.

Given Trump's persistent base strength but very substantial legal, health, and intra-party barriers and the current market pricing, I assess a modest but non-negligible chance that Donald Trump will be the 2028 Republican nominee, with a central estimate of 18%. This reflects recognition of his unique political assets tempered by practical obstacles that make his nomination improbable but plausible.

I assign a 25% chance the Supreme Court will formally overturn Obergefell v. Hodges before 2029; reversal is plausible given doctrinal momentum but remains an uphill, politically fraught lift that requires a cert-worthy vehicle and a majority willing to jettison a high‑profile precedent.

I assess a low probability (8%) that Trump will actually buy at least part of Greenland during a term ending by Jan 20, 2029. Rhetoric and strategic pressure make headlines likely, but legal, political, and practical barriers make a genuine purchase unlikely.

**Independent assessment:** I estimate a 65% chance the U.S. will fall below 7.60 on The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index at some point during the Trump administration between 2025 and 2028 — a meaningful probability, but materially lower than the market’s ~78% price.

I assess a ~25% independent probability that USAID will be eliminated during a Trump term (through formal abolition or functional absorption). The agency faces real political risk but strong institutional inertia and statutory protections make outright elimination unlikely.

Given multiple credible reports that Conor McGregor is officially booked to rematch Max Holloway at UFC 329 and his stated intent to remain active under his current contract, I assess a very high probability that McGregor will have a next fight before 2028.

Spencer Pratt is a plausible, but not certain, top-two finisher in the June 2 LA mayoral primary; I assess his independent chance at about two-thirds given the most recent polling, momentum, and vote-splitting dynamics.

I assess ~30% chance that a future Trump administration will take actions that meaningfully expand high‑skill immigration/H‑1B access during his term — modestly higher than the market’s 20% but still low given political incentives and his prior record.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance (~25%) that total federal government spending will be lower by 250 (interpreted as $250 billion) before 2028 — enacted and proposed cuts add up materially but are unlikely to produce a net $250B decline once offsets, baseline growth, and political resistance are accounted for.

I assess a 30% chance Clarence Thomas resigns during President Trump’s term (Jan 20, 2025–Jan 20, 2029). Age and uncertainty create meaningful tail risk, but historical incentives and his track record point toward him remaining on the bench.

I assess a very low independent probability (3%) that the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029. Ordinary diplomatic or administrative changes are plausible; any transfer of sovereignty is extremely unlikely given legal, political, and international constraints.

Based on recent data and realistic growth/exchange-rate scenarios, China overtaking U.S. nominal GDP by 2030 is unlikely; I assess about a 10% chance, mainly driven by extreme downside for the U.S. or unexpected RMB appreciation.

Independent estimate: low probability. Given the very high bar for removal (a 2/3 Senate conviction) and strong historical reluctance of senators to remove a president from office, I assess a modest chance that Trump will be both impeached and removed before his term ends.

Given the structural advantages of incumbency, fundraising and name recognition, I assess Karen Bass as the clear favorite to win the 2026 Los Angeles mayoral election, though a competitive race or runoff remains plausible.

I estimate a modestly better-than-even chance that at least one U.S. quarterly real GDP print will exceed 5% (annualized) sometime in Q1 2025–Q4 2028 — my independent probability is 58%. This reflects the multi-quarter window, the possibility of fiscal or inventory-driven spikes, and the asymmetric ways big shocks can produce outsized quarterly rebounds.

Abolition of the Department of Education before Jan 20, 2029 is unlikely; I assign low probability because statutory repeal requires Congress, urgent operational issues (student loans, civil rights enforcement) make full abolition politically and practically difficult within one presidential term.

I assess a modest but meaningful chance that the 25th Amendment will be used during Trump's term — most likely via a voluntary, temporary Section 3 transfer for a medical event or, less likely, a contentious Section 4 push — my independent probability: 22%.

I estimate a 12% probability that Marine Le Pen will win the 2027 French presidential election, higher than the current market-implied ~5.5% but still low because France's two-round system and broad non-RN coalitions make a Le Pen victory difficult absent major political realignment or crises.

Given the lack of recent public information and the market-implied 36% probability, I assess a 30% chance that Hyperliquid will reach $100 by December 31, 2026, because reaching that level within the available time requires strong macro tailwinds, meaningful token supply dynamics, or major positive catalysts that currently are not evident.

Independent estimate: James Ho is a plausible front‑runner but not the favorite — I assess a 22% chance he will be the next Supreme Court justice by Jan 20, 2029, because he combines strong conservative credentials and confirmability advantages but faces a low overall vacancy certainty and stiff competition.

I assess an 8% chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026, because a rapid, large rally is possible but requires a confluence of strong, short-timeline catalysts against substantial macro and regulatory headwinds.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act through Jan 1, 2027 — roughly 15% — because the legal/political barriers are high even though the president’s rhetoric and crisis incentives raise tail risk.

I assess a modestly better-than-even chance that the Bears will announce a new primary location in Illinois by the start of the 2028 season, but the outcome hinges on a narrow legislative window in Springfield and several approval/finance steps that leave meaningful downside risk.

I assess a low probability (18%) that any candidate will secure an outright majority (>50%) in Colombia's May 31, 2026 first round, because the field is likely to remain fragmented and Colombia's recent electoral history favors run-offs, though a late consolidation behind a single candidate could still produce a surprise first-round victory.

Independent assessment: I assign a 38% chance that the next President will confirm exactly one Supreme Court justice during the 2025–2029 term — lower than the market's 60% for '1'. I view 2 confirmations as the single most plausible count after accounting for baseline retirement/death risk and political dynamics.

Given the short time remaining, lack of public reporting of a diplomatic breakthrough, and the political incentives to maintain leverage, I assess a low but non-negligible chance that President Trump will officially announce the blockade has been lifted by May 31, 2026.

I assess a modest but non-negligible chance that the Dallas Cowboys will win the 2027 NFC Championship, higher than the current market-implied 8.4% but still below the odds of a clear favorite.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (15%) that Extended's token will show an FDV above $800M one day after launch, given the market's strong skepticism, the high threshold, and substantial uncertainty about tokenomics and listing plans.