Edges for May 29, 2026

I estimate a ~12% chance Elon Musk’s net worth will exceed $1 trillion before 2027. It’s possible but requires one or more very large, fast-moving valuation events (an outsized SpaceX public valuation and/or a dramatic Tesla rally) within ~7 months.

Given normal traffic volumes through the Strait of Hormuz and the short remaining window, I assess a very high probability that IMF Portwatch will publish at least one daily transit count of 20 or more by May 31, 2026.

OpenAI is more likely than Anthropic to be the first of the two to complete an IPO by 2040; based on current public signals I assess a substantially better-than-even chance that OpenAI goes first.

I estimate a substantially lower chance than the market that the UK Prime Minister (Keir Starmer) will be the first G7 leader to leave; I put that probability at 40% and allocate the rest to other vulnerable leaders (Italy, France, Germany, Japan).

I assess a 70% probability that the market's 'Yes' outcome occurs — the very large 2026 measles burden (1,952 confirmed as of May 21) creates a high baseline that makes a high multi-year average considerably more likely than markets currently price.

I assign a 22% chance that at least one U.S. quarter between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 will show real GDP above 5% annualized — a plausible but distinctly tail outcome driven by one-off rebounds, large fiscal shocks, or concentrated AI-led capex bursts.

I assess a very low probability (4%) that the U.S. will legally or forcibly regain sovereign control of the Panama Canal during Trump's term; the market (~31%) is highly overstating plausibility driven by political narrative rather than realistic pathways.

I assess a solid but not overwhelming probability that Elon Musk will be the world's first trillionaire by 2030—SpaceX going public at a very high valuation is the dominant path, but meaningful execution, dilution, timing and macro risks leave substantial downside.

I assess a 20% chance Barron Trump is granted a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029 — low but non-negligible because preemptive clemency is legally possible and Trump has shown willingness to use pardons aggressively, while there is currently no public legal trigger and high political cost to pardoning a son.

Independent assessment: I assign a 38% chance that the next President will confirm exactly one Supreme Court justice during the 2025–2029 term — lower than the market's 60% for '1'. I view 2 confirmations as the single most plausible count after accounting for baseline retirement/death risk and political dynamics.

I assess a 28% chance that the equity-market "bull case" described in the brief (AI-led earnings durability, a continuing S&P upside through 2026, and a meaningful broadening of the rally) will materialize in 2026. The structural upside from AI is real, but concentrated leadership, macro/monetary risks, and event ambiguity make the outcome more likely to fail than succeed within a single calendar year.

I estimate a modestly-favored but far from certain chance (45%) that the Chicago pro football team will complete a relocation to a new Illinois site in time for the 2028 regular-season opener; substantial hurdles make this outcome only plausible with concrete, fast-moving progress over the next 24 months.

**Independent assessment:** I assign a 15% chance that the United States will formally acquire any part of Greenland by 2029 — a low but non‑negligible probability driven by political unpredictability and strategic tail routes, but strongly limited by legal, diplomatic, and local political barriers.

I assess a ~43% chance that President Trump will be impeached by the House before Jan 20, 2029 — a meaningful but not majority probability driven by the 2026 House outcome and the pace of new incriminating evidence.

Independent estimate: Scottie Scheffler has about a 24% chance to complete the career Grand Slam (i.e., win a U.S. Open) before 2028 — materially higher than the current market price (Yes: 6%).

I assess a materially higher-than-market chance that a credible ‘bear case’ for Trump will manifest in 2026 — about one-in-three — driven by macro downside plus governance/policy shocks, though the scenario requires a confluence of events rather than a single, obvious trigger.

I assign a 25% chance that Trump will complete a comprehensive U.S.–China free trade agreement (FTA) before Jan 20, 2029. The balance of evidence points to incremental, transactional deals rather than a treaty-level FTA; an FTA would require major political and institutional shifts or a strong catalyst to materialize.

I assess a 20% probability that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, reflecting his enduring base strength but substantial legal, health, and political headwinds that make his path unlikely.

I assess a 60% probability that the Oklahoma City Thunder will win the 2026 NBA Finals, slightly above the market-implied 57.5% based on the Thunder's young core, organizational continuity, and matchup advantages, while accounting for injury and matchup risks that keep the probability well short of certainty.

I assign a 25% chance the Supreme Court will formally overturn Obergefell v. Hodges before 2029; reversal is plausible given doctrinal momentum but remains an uphill, politically fraught lift that requires a cert-worthy vehicle and a majority willing to jettison a high‑profile precedent.

I assess a 25% chance that NYC's population will fall in the -0.99% to 0% range from July 2025 to July 2027; I view a modest population increase (0.01–0.99%) as substantially more likely given ongoing immigration and partial rebound in residency patterns.

I assess it as overwhelmingly likely there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during President Trump's term — the diplomatic, legal, legislative, and political barriers make an actual purchase extremely unlikely.

Given the very short time until the June 30 cutoff and persistent technical and political obstacles on both sides, I assess a significantly less-than-even chance of a publicly announced US–Iran nuclear agreement by the deadline; it's possible but unlikely.

**Independent assessment:** I estimate a 65% chance the U.S. will fall below 7.60 on The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index at some point during the Trump administration between 2025 and 2028 — a meaningful probability, but materially lower than the market’s ~78% price.

Given the market tilt toward a Chiefs reunion but substantial contractual and cap frictions, I assess a below-even chance that Tyreek Hill will be playing for the Kansas City Chiefs on August 31, 2026.

Aaron Lukas is the frontrunner to become Trump’s permanent DNI because he’s already installed as acting and was publicly named by Trump; I assign him a plurality but not certainty given Trump’s prior pattern of choosing higher-profile political allies.

I assess a 30% chance Clarence Thomas resigns during President Trump’s term (Jan 20, 2025–Jan 20, 2029). Age and uncertainty create meaningful tail risk, but historical incentives and his track record point toward him remaining on the bench.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026; my probability estimate is 15%, reflecting a combination of bullish structural drivers but steep short-term upside requirements and meaningful macro and regulatory risks.

Given multiple credible reports that Conor McGregor is officially booked to rematch Max Holloway at UFC 329 and his stated intent to remain active under his current contract, I assess a very high probability that McGregor will have a next fight before 2028.

I assess a low probability (10%) that President Trump will succeed in buying (i.e., having the United States acquire sovereignty over) at least part of Greenland during his term; there is a small non‑zero chance driven by pressure tactics, creative legal framing, or a lease/limited acquisition, but major political and legal barriers make success unlikely.

I assess ~30% chance that a future Trump administration will take actions that meaningfully expand high‑skill immigration/H‑1B access during his term — modestly higher than the market’s 20% but still low given political incentives and his prior record.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance (~25%) that total federal government spending will be lower by 250 (interpreted as $250 billion) before 2028 — enacted and proposed cuts add up materially but are unlikely to produce a net $250B decline once offsets, baseline growth, and political resistance are accounted for.

Market strongly favors Yes and liquidity/depth on Binance make a June 2 noon close above $66,000 plausible; I assign a high but not certain probability because short-term tail risks (flash crashes, exchange outages, negative macro/regulatory shocks) remain non-negligible.

I assess a 28% chance that Tea's token will have an FDV above $80M one day after launch, reflecting modest odds that Tea will both launch a tradable token before 2028 and that initial pricing/distribution will support an FDV above this threshold.

I assess a **12%** independent probability that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends — low but materially above a historical zero baseline; the market at ~21% appears to be pricing additional tail risks or confusion with removal pathways.

I assess a very low independent probability (3%) that the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029. Ordinary diplomatic or administrative changes are plausible; any transfer of sovereignty is extremely unlikely given legal, political, and international constraints.

Based on recent data and realistic growth/exchange-rate scenarios, China overtaking U.S. nominal GDP by 2030 is unlikely; I assess about a 10% chance, mainly driven by extreme downside for the U.S. or unexpected RMB appreciation.

I assess Marine Le Pen has a modest but non-negligible chance of winning the 2027 French presidency, with substantial structural obstacles making victory unlikely; I assign a 14% probability to a Le Pen win.

Spencer Pratt is a plausible, but not certain, top-two finisher in the June 2 LA mayoral primary; I assess his independent chance at about two-thirds given the most recent polling, momentum, and vote-splitting dynamics.

I assess a 65% probability that Karen Bass wins the 2026 Los Angeles mayoral election, reflecting incumbency and resource advantages balanced against significant policy vulnerabilities and turnout uncertainty.

Given the market price (Yes 86.5%) and NVIDIA's dominant position in AI hardware and software growth drivers, I assess a high probability that NVIDIA will remain the largest company by market cap on June 30, 2026, but meaningful short-term tail risks could still reverse that outcome.

I assess an 8% probability that Ethereum will reach $10,000 by December 31, 2026, reflecting a low but non-negligible tail-upside tied to a broad crypto bull market and strong institutional flows versus substantial macro, regulatory, and adoption constraints.

I assess the New York Yankees have an 18% chance to win the 2026 World Series, slightly above the current market-implied probability, based on organizational resources and upside tempered by rotation health, AL competition, and postseason variance.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (11%) that Arkham’s Satoshi entity will show an Outflow or Swaps entry in 2026, with most of the probability coming from classification/relabeling risk and a smaller tail risk from an actual private-key movement or compromise.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (6%) that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 1 will be above $78,000, reflecting short-term flash-rally risk despite strong market consensus toward No.