Will Trump abolish the Department of Education?

The key issue is that “abolished” is a much harder standard than simply weakening the department, moving functions elsewhere, or cutting its budget. Eliminating a cabinet-level department usually requires legislation that can survive the Senate, implementation by the executive branch, and likely litigation over whether core statutory responsibilities have been properly reassigned. Trump has long signaled hostility to the Department of Education, and there is a plausible path where a Republican Congress and administration attempt major restructuring, but the institutional friction is substantial. That makes a yes outcome real, yet still materially less likely than a no outcome.

The strongest argument for yes is political alignment. If Trump maintains influence over the GOP and Republicans control both chambers for at least part of the term, there is a nontrivial chance they pursue a flagship anti-bureaucracy win, especially if they want to fulfill a longstanding conservative promise. Education is also one of the few cabinet departments with a clear ideological target and a constituency on the other side that is already skeptical of federal control, which could make abolition a symbolic priority. If the administration is willing to bundle abolition with a transfer of functions to states and other agencies, the proposal could become more viable than it appears at first glance.

The strongest argument against yes is procedural reality. Senate math is the biggest obstacle, and even with unified Republican control, margin size matters because this is not a routine appropriations fight but a structural reorganization with major downstream effects on student loans, civil rights enforcement, special education, and federal education funding. A clean abolition would likely face resistance from moderates, affected states, universities, teachers’ groups, and any lawmakers worried about losing federal leverage over education policy. In addition, administrations can substantially reduce an agency’s power without formally eliminating it, which means political energy may stop short of the legally harder endpoint.

Compared with the market price of 14%, my view is that the market is slightly too pessimistic on the chance of some kind of true abolition, but not by a huge margin. The market seems to be correctly discounting how hard it is to pass and sustain a formal elimination, yet it may be underweighting the possibility of a motivated second-term Trump administration using congressional control and administrative pressure to push through an actual statutory repeal or merger. I would not call this a strong mispricing, but 18% feels more defensible than 14% given the tail-risk of a disciplined partisan push.