Edges for May 26, 2026

Scottie Scheffler has already completed the four modern majors (the standard *career grand slam*), so under the usual golf definition the event is already true — I assign a 99% independent probability that this market should resolve Yes; the tiny haircut reflects settlement-definition and platform risk.

Independent view: a very small but non‑zero chance (~6%) that Elon Musk's net worth exceeds $1 trillion before 2027; current market price (Yes = 90%) appears massively overstated versus fundamentals.

Assuming 'Yes' = OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic, I assess OpenAI has a strong lead based on a reported September 2026 target and stronger near‑term incentives to list; I put the independent probability at 78%.

**Independent assessment:** Very unlikely — I estimate a ~7% chance Barron Trump receives a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029.

I assess a very low probability (~4%) that Trump will ‘take back’ legal or de facto U.S. control of the Panama Canal during his term — reversing 1999 sovereignty transfer would require extraordinary legal, diplomatic, or military steps that are highly unlikely.

I assess a 35% independent probability that the Chicago pro football team will relocate to a new location in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 regular season — plausible but not probable given timing, financing and approval hurdles.

I assess a substantial but not overwhelming chance that Elon Musk will be the world's first trillionaire before 1 Jan 2030 — driven primarily by a SpaceX IPO at a very high valuation, but conditioned on several difficult-to-achieve outcomes and meaningful downside risks.

I estimate roughly a 30% chance that the coordinated “bull case” for Trump — meaningful legal relief plus credible policy wins and market/economic momentum — materializes in 2026, substantially higher than the current market price of ~6% but far from a majority outcome.

I assess a roughly one-in-four chance that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, meaning Yes is unlikely but plausible if several favorable conditions align for him.

I assess a low chance (12%) that the United States will acquire any part of Greenland (i.e., a formal transfer of territory or equivalent sovereign control) before Jan 21, 2029. The combination of legal, diplomatic, and local political barriers makes such an outcome unlikely despite strategic incentives and presidential interest.

Given historical patterns of regular commercial transits through the Strait of Hormuz, the short remaining window of six days, and no widely reported large-scale disruptions, I assess a better-than-even chance that at least one daily count will reach 20 by May 31, 2026.

I assign a low probability that Trump will *purchase sovereign territory of Greenland* during his term; a narrowly higher chance exists for transactional acquisitions (leases, concessions, property) but not transfer of sovereignty.

Independent assessment: D. John Sauer is a plausible nominee but not the frontrunner on fundamentals — I estimate a ~32% chance he will be the next Supreme Court Justice by Jan 20, 2029, with other vetted appellate judges collectively more likely than markets currently price them.

Given the very short time window and high political cost of publicly accepting Iranian uranium enrichment, I assess a low probability that the United States will definitively agree to continued enrichment by May 31, 2026, but limited, highly conditional concessions remain plausible.

I assess a very high probability that there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term — roughly 94% — because the legal, political, and diplomatic barriers are large and persistent despite rhetorical pressure.

I assess a modest but real chance that USAID will be formally eliminated during a second Trump term. My independent probability is 30% — elimination is possible under narrow political conditions but faces substantial legal, institutional, and political barriers.

I assess a ~39% chance that U.S. GDP will register at least one quarter above 5% (annualized) in Q1 2025–Q4 2028. Hitting the 5% bar is plausible via a post-recession bounce or a large, concentrated stimulus/inventory/AI investment wave, but on balance historical rarity and current policy headwinds make it unlikely.

I assess the Carolina Hurricanes have a modestly better-than-market chance to win the 2026 Stanley Cup, with a 38% probability driven by roster depth and a strong defensive structure but constrained by playoff variance and matchup risks.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (12%) that the Fed will cut the upper bound of the target federal funds rate by 25 bps at the June 16–17, 2026 FOMC meeting, with most scenarios pointing to no change in June and the first cut more likely later in the summer or autumn.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (12%) that the IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average for Strait of Hormuz transit calls will reach or exceed 60 by May 31, 2026, because the short time window, persistent security and insurance disincentives, and the smoothing effect of a 7-day average make a rapid recovery unlikely, though a sudden de-escalation or export surge could push the metric above the threshold.

I assess a high probability that the FOMC will leave the upper bound of the target federal funds rate unchanged at the July 28–29, 2026 meeting, with an 85% chance of no change, reflecting policy inertia, market expectations, and the timing of incoming data that typically pushes major moves to later meetings.

I assess a roughly 22% chance that Trump will formally invoke the Insurrection Act at some point during his presidency (through early 2027 per the market deadline) — more likely than the market price but still unlikely absent a major, sustained breakdown of public order or state-level refusal to act.

I assess a relatively low but non-negligible chance (12%) that Trump will be impeached and *removed* before his term ends — removal is the hard part because it requires a 2/3 Senate conviction.

Marine Le Pen has a meaningful but still small path to victory: she is a durable, high-profile contender with a solid base, but structural and coalition dynamics in French runoffs make her overall probability of winning the 2027 election low; I assess about a 12% chance she wins.

I assess a 60% chance that the Fed will make no 25-bp rate cuts in 2026, slightly below the market-implied probability but still reflecting a greater-than-even likelihood that policy stays on hold for the year.

There is a modest but below-even chance that President Trump will publicly and unambiguously announce the end of the U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by May 31, 2026; I assess this at 25% given the short time window and the requirement for a clear, explicit statement.

I assess McLaren's chances of taking the 2026 Constructors’ Championship at about 12%, higher than the current market-implied ~5.6% but still low given likely strength of rivals and the need for a significant step in car and PU performance.

I assess a modestly below-even chance that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average >= 60 for Strait of Hormuz transit calls by June 30, 2026, assigning a 45% probability to Yes based on the balance of normalization drivers and persistent security/operational frictions.

I assess a modestly-better-than-even chance that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029 (57%). The window includes a midterm (2026) that can change House control and many ongoing legal and political pressure points that make an impeachment vote plausible.

I assess a 12% probability that China will commence a military offensive to establish control over any part of Taiwan by December 31, 2026, reflecting a low but non-negligible near-term risk driven by capacity improvements and political incentives but constrained by deterrence and high costs.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that XRP will touch $1.60 before the end of May, primarily because the time window is very short and would require a large, rapid rally or a surprise positive catalyst.

I assess it as extremely unlikely that any part of Cuba will become the 51st U.S. state by Jan 20, 2029 — around a 1% chance, driven only by an extraordinary, low-probability cascade of regime collapse, cession, or forcible occupation plus rapid Congressional approval.

I assess a very low probability that the U.S. will acquire any new sovereign territory before 2027-01-01 — my independent estimate is ~5% based on legal, political, and timeline constraints; the market at 10% looks mildly optimistic and may be pricing rhetoric and headline risk rather than substantive likelihood.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that President Trump will personally announce his resignation before the end of his term; my independent probability is 15%. This reflects the high bar for a voluntary presidential resignation and the specific political incentives that work strongly against it, partially offset by legal and health tail risks that could force or induce a resignation.

I assess a low but materially non-trivial chance (~14%) that Elon Musk will personally travel to Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — higher than the market's 9% but still far below even odds because the question combines uncertain mission timelines with the long-shot of Musk surviving and choosing to go.

I assess a roughly 40% chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel's next Prime Minister after the 2026 election, reflecting his enduring advantages but significant legal and coalition vulnerabilities that make his return uncertain.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (~6%) of a Fed funds rate cut during the Dec 16, 2025–Jan 27–28, 2026 window, with most scenarios favoring no cut but a small tail risk from either very rapid disinflation or an emergency market event.

I assess a 32% probability that Aryna Sabalenka will win the 2026 U.S. Open women's singles, slightly above the market-implied 27.5% because her game profile and past hard‑court Slam results make her one of the clearest single-player threats, but multi-year depth of the WTA field and injury/variance risk limit her upside.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that the State Department will issue a Level 4 (Do Not Travel) advisory for Taiwan before 2027-01-01 — my independent probability is 12%. The bar for Level 4 is high and current public indicators point strongly toward continued Level 1 status unless a sharp military escalation or evacuation trigger occurs.