US real GDP growth in 2035?
My independent view is that 2035 US real GDP growth is most likely to land near trend, with the highest probability on the 2.1% to 2.5% band and a meaningful chance of 1.6% to 2.0%. I think the market is a bit too pessimistic on the upper-trend outcomes and too concentrated in sub-2% growth cases.
Analysis
The strongest anchor is that official forecasters are still clustering around about 2% long-run US real GDP growth, not a structurally lower number. The Fed’s longer-run median is 2.0%, and its near-term path through 2029 remains close to that level, which suggests the baseline expectation for 2035 should still center on trend growth rather than stagnation or a dramatic acceleration. That makes the middle-of-the-distribution outcomes, especially 1.6% to 2.5%, the most plausible cluster.
The main reason to lean slightly above 2% rather than below it is that the economy still has credible upside from productivity, particularly if AI diffusion produces a sustained capital deepening and efficiency gain. That said, mainstream institutions are not baking in a productivity regime shift, so the more aggressive 2.6% to 3.0% band should remain only a secondary tail case rather than the base case. In contrast, the 0.0% or below and 0.6% to 1.0% bands require either a prolonged productivity disappointment or a major structural slowdown, both of which are possible but not the central forecast.
Compared with the market, I think the pricing leans a little too heavily toward weak-growth outcomes and underweights the chance that the US simply keeps growing near trend for another decade. The market’s top probabilities are spread across several bands, but my view is that the modal outcome is a bit higher than the market suggests, with the 2.1% to 2.5% range clearly the single best bet and 1.6% to 2.0% close behind. The market looks mildly mispriced if it is treating sub-2% growth as more likely than a continued trend-growth regime.
Arguments
For
- Arguments for Yes: Official long-run forecasts still anchor near 2%, which supports the higher-probability middle bands.
- Arguments for Yes: If AI-driven productivity compounds over the decade, growth can plausibly sit in the 2.1% to 2.5% range rather than falling below 2%.
Against
- Arguments against Yes: The long-run trend is not fast enough to make 2.6% to 3.0% the most likely outcome.
- Arguments against Yes: Demographic slowdown and cyclical volatility make sustained growth above 2.5% hard to sustain for an entire year like 2035.
Key drivers
- The Fed’s long-run forecast remains centered near 2%, which is the best official baseline for 2035 growth.
- AI and broader productivity gains create a plausible upside path that supports growth slightly above trend.
Risk factors
- A multi-year productivity disappointment would push the outcome toward the 1.0% range or lower.
- Structural headwinds such as aging, weaker labor force growth, or policy drag could keep growth below 2%.
Scenarios
Best case
Productivity growth accelerates meaningfully, labor markets remain healthy, and 2035 real GDP growth lands in the 2.1% to 2.5% band or even briefly above it.
Most likely
US growth in 2035 stays close to trend, with the most likely outcome in the 2.1% to 2.5% range and the 1.6% to 2.0% range as the main alternative.
Worst case
Structural slowdown dominates, productivity disappoints, and growth falls into the 0.6% to 1.0% range or lower.
Outcomes
| Outcome | AI | MKT |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1% to 2.5% | 30% | 14% |
| 0.0% or Below | 7% | 12% |
| 0.6% to 1.0% | 13% | 11% |
| 1.6% to 2.0% | 24% | 10% |
| 2.6% to 3.0% | 12% | 9% |
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