Putin out as President of Russia by...?
I think the market is pricing a meaningful but still too-high tail risk of sudden removal. My estimate is 5% for Putin to be out as president by year-end 2026.
Analysis
The newest reporting from the past week shows Putin still operating as an active, centralized decision-maker rather than a leader in visible transition. On July 8 he was on a government video call as Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced a diesel export ban and other emergency steps to stabilize fuel supply, which suggests the Kremlin is still in crisis-management mode and not in succession mode.
The main reason the yes probability is not zero is that Russia is under real internal strain. AP reported widespread fuel shortages, rationing, and long lines at stations after Ukrainian strikes on refineries and other infrastructure, and fresh polling released on July 10 showed Putin’s approval and trust dipping again for a second straight week. That combination matters because domestic pressure can widen elite anxiety, but the reporting still points to containment rather than an imminent break in the regime.
Reuters reporting from July 9 adds the most important political signal: sources close to the Kremlin said Putin is rejecting calls to negotiate peace and is more likely to escalate the war than compromise, while the Kremlin publicly says he remains open to dialogue and ready for another call with Trump. My inference from that mix is that the system is still organized around Putin’s continued rule, even if the war and fuel crisis are eroding comfort levels underneath. The 8.5% market price seems a bit rich relative to the absence of any concrete removal, resignation, or incapacity signal, so I come in below market at 5%.
Arguments
For
- Arguments for Yes: The fuel crisis and export bans show the war is creating visible domestic strain that could escalate into broader political instability.
- Arguments for Yes: Fresh July polling showed Putin’s approval and trust falling again, which can weaken the perception of inevitability around his rule.
- Arguments for Yes: Reuters reported sources close to the Kremlin saying Putin may choose escalation over compromise, and high-stakes wartime escalation can produce abrupt, unpredictable regime shocks.
Against
- Arguments against Yes: Putin remained publicly in charge on July 8, directly overseeing government responses to the fuel crisis, which is not the profile of a leader about to exit.
- Arguments against Yes: Reuters reporting indicates Putin is still driving war policy and rejecting peace pressure, which points to continuity rather than resignation.
- Arguments against Yes: Even though polling softened, the available figures still imply substantial support, far from the kind of collapse usually associated with forced removal.
Key drivers
- The depth of the fuel shortage matters because it is the clearest sign that Ukraine’s strikes are affecting daily life inside Russia.
- Putin’s continued public management of the crisis reduces the chance that we are already in a transition period.
- Any sudden health event, security incident, or elite move would be the fastest path to a yes resolution.
- The Kremlin’s apparent preference for escalation over compromise raises the risk of a black-swan shock, even if it does not currently imply removal.
Risk factors
- A sudden medical or security incident could force Putin out with little warning, and the market would resolve yes immediately upon an announcement.
- Elite conflict could widen if the fuel and economic problems intensify faster than the Kremlin can contain them.
- The war could still produce an unexpected political break if military setbacks, economic stress, and public frustration reinforce one another.
- If no credible removal signal appears soon, the yes price may bleed lower as the year progresses and the market reverts toward status quo expectations.
Scenarios
Best case
A sudden death, severe health crisis, forced resignation, or elite-backed removal occurs before December 31, 2026, and the market resolves Yes quickly. The recent fuel crisis and political strain would then look like early warning signs rather than just background pressure.
Most likely
The fuel crisis and approval softening continue to create noise, but the Kremlin contains the damage and Putin remains in office through December 31, 2026. That outcome is still the most likely because the available reporting shows strain, not a credible transition.
Worst case
Putin keeps absorbing the fuel shock, continues to direct the war, and stays president through year-end with no announcement of resignation or incapacity. In that case the market resolves No and the recent volatility is remembered as real but insufficient pressure.
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