Who will be the next Prime Minister of Israel after the next election?
I assess Netanyahu has a modest plurality chance to return as Israel’s next sworn-in prime minister after the 27 October 2026 election, primarily because of incumbency advantages, a resilient right-wing coalition base, and his coalition-building skill, partially offset by legal exposure, coalition fragility, and the possibility of unified opposition blocs.
Analysis
Market-implied probability (Yes ≈36.5%) and heavy trading volume (~$20M) show substantial market interest and a divided market; I set a somewhat higher probability (42%) because incumbency and Likud’s organizational strengths typically understate tail risks and because Netanyahu’s personal electoral resilience historically outperforms headline negatives. The market price is a useful anchor but traders often discount low-probability coalition failures or post-election negotiations that can change outcomes between election day and the swearing-in date.
Institutional and structural context favors someone who can stitch together a coalition: Israel’s proportional representation and multiparty fragmentation mean that the largest party does not automatically win the premiership, but a dominant party leader with disciplined coalition partners has a distinct advantage in the bargaining phase. Netanyahu’s long experience, deep party machinery, and relationships with right-wing and religious blocs increase his odds of being chosen to form a government if the right-leaning bloc remains sizable, but those same partners (and their demands) can create fragility and encourage strategic defections or deals with centrist players.
External and contingent factors will likely be decisive nearer the election and during the coalition-formation window: security incidents or a major deterioration in the security environment will typically boost the incumbent and benefit Netanyahu, while sustained economic pain, large-scale protests, or damaging legal developments (e.g., a final court ruling, immunity negotiations, or politically salient indictments) would materially lower his chances. International diplomatic pressure or incentives from major allies could also tilt potential kingmakers; finally, the possibility of an early election or a protracted failure to form a government could yield a different sworn-in PM or 'Other' resolving the market.
Arguments
For
- Netanyahu benefits from incumbency, name recognition, and a highly developed personal and party campaign machine with proven vote-getting capacity.
- He has a track record of surviving political crises and negotiating complex coalition deals, which helps in the post-election bargaining phase.
- Right-wing and religious blocs have historically been reliable partners for Netanyahu, giving him a plausible path to the 61-seat threshold if they maintain strength.
- Security-focused voters often consolidate behind experienced leaders in times of perceived threat, and Netanyahu’s brand is associated with security policy.
- Netanyahu’s deep ties with international leaders and donors can translate into external support that reassures potential coalition partners.
- Even when not the largest single-party beneficiary, Netanyahu can sometimes broker agreements and leverage political experience to become the eventual PM.
Against
- Ongoing or new legal liabilities could make coalition partners reluctant to swear in a leader facing serious indictments or an adverse ruling.
- Political fatigue and large anti-Netanyahu mobilization could increase turnout for opposition lists sufficient to deny a pro-Netanyahu majority.
- The multiparty system means the mere plurality in votes does not guarantee the premiership—kingmakers may prefer a different candidate in exchange for better ministerial deals.
- Internal disagreements within the right/religious camp over policy or portfolio distribution could produce defections and undermine a Netanyahu-led coalition.
- International reputational costs associated with a Netanyahu government could incentivize centrist parties to avoid formal coalition ties that would enable his swearing-in.
- A charismatic or unifying opposition leader could assemble a broad enough coalition to form a government even if Netanyahu’s party remains largest.
Key drivers
- Likud’s raw vote share and ability to deliver Knesset seats to coalition partners will be the single most important determinant of Netanyahu’s ability to form a government.
- The cohesion and choices of smaller right-wing and religious parties (their willingness to sit in coalition or to defect) are critical to turning votes into a sworn-in prime minister.
- The legal state of Netanyahu’s corruption cases and any parliamentary moves around immunity or judicial reform will both influence voter sentiment and the willingness of partners to back him.
- Security events (escalations, cross-border incidents, or major terrorist attacks) shortly before or after the election tend to boost incumbents and can reshape coalition math rapidly.
- Opposition unity and the emergence of a credible, broadly acceptable alternative leader able to assemble a cross-ideological coalition will reduce Netanyahu’s probability of returning.
- International diplomatic pressures and incentives from key allies could alter calculations of kingmaker parties worried about diplomatic or economic costs of backing Netanyahu.
Risk factors
- A conviction or significant adverse legal development before or immediately after the election could make some potential coalition partners unwilling to swear in Netanyahu.
- A large or sustained public protest movement could shift undecided voters and make centrist blocs larger at the margin.
- A surprise security crisis that undermines perceptions of Netanyahu’s management could depress his vote despite the usual 'rally' effect being more common in Israel.
- Fragmentation of the right into multiple new parties could reduce seat efficiency and prevent a clear pro-Netanyahu bloc majority in the Knesset.
- A unified centrist/left/blocking coalition that successfully negotiates with nationalist parties could form an alternative majority, denying Netanyahu the premiership despite being the single largest party.
- International sanctions, conditional support, or strong diplomatic pressure against a Netanyahu-led government could induce domestic partners to seek alternatives.
Scenarios
Best case
Netanyahu’s bloc wins a clear plurality, smaller right-wing and religious parties remain disciplined, no new debilitating legal developments occur, and post-election bargaining secures 61+ supportive Knesset members quickly, leading to Netanyahu being sworn in shortly after the election.
Most likely
A close election where Netanyahu’s Likud performs strongly but not overwhelmingly, requiring intensive coalition negotiations; he remains a leading contender but faces significant hurdles from legal exposure and coalition demands, producing a roughly 40-45% chance he is sworn in as prime minister after the October 2026 vote.
Worst case
Legal or political shocks (an adverse final court decision or a major split among right-wing partners), combined with a unified opposition coalition and successful backroom deals by centrist kingmakers, result in a different leader assembling a majority and being sworn in, or prolonged deadlock that ultimately resolves to 'Other'.
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