Will the 25th Amendment be used during Trump's Presidency?
I assess a ~38% independent probability that the 25th Amendment will be *used* at least once during Trump's presidency — most likely via a Section 3 voluntary transfer for a medical procedure, with a smaller tail risk of a Section 4 involuntary declaration.
Analysis
**Stage 1 — Blind analysis (ignore current market prices):**
- *Legal mechanics and precedent.* The 25th Amendment contains two distinct pathways that could produce a "Yes" outcome: Section 3 (voluntary, president declares inability and transfers power temporarily) and Section 4 (involuntary, VP + majority of principal officers declare the president unable). Historically, Section 3 has been used for routine medical procedures by presidents; Section 4 has never been successfully used. The constitutional thresholds for a Section 4 involuntary removal are high — a written declaration by VP + majority of cabinet and then possible congressional adjudication requiring two-thirds of both houses to sustain removal if the president disputes it.
- *Epidemiology of presidential incapacitation and practice.* Given the president's age and the remaining ~2.6-year horizon through Jan 2029, routine medical procedures requiring anesthesia (colonoscopy, dental surgery, etc.) are plausibly likely. Many modern presidents have used Section 3 at least once to cover short, planned incapacitations. By contrast, a politically driven Section 4 invocation requires not only an objectively incapacitating event but also a politically willing VP and a majority of the Cabinet who are ready to act against a sitting president — a very high bar in the current polarized environment.
- *Quantitative decomposition of my independent probability.* I assign approximate component probabilities (independent analysis, not market-calibrated): **~30%** chance at least one *Section 3* voluntary transfer occurs during routine or unexpected medical procedures; **~8%** chance of an *involuntary* Section 4 invocation triggered by acute incapacity plus political decision-making. Combining these (accounting for overlap) yields an aggregate independent probability of **~38%** that the 25th Amendment will be used at least once before Jan 20, 2029.
- *Reasoning behind the numbers.* The 30% for Section 3 reflects: (a) the commonality of at least one medical procedure requiring brief anesthesia in an 80+-year-old during a multi-year term; (b) the historical pattern of presidents formally transferring power in those cases; and (c) uncertainty about whether this president would accept or permit a formal Section 3 transfer (he may resist). The 8% for Section 4 reflects the low historical and institutional likelihood of cabinet/VP coordination to remove a sitting president, elevated only slightly by intense political controversies and repeated public calls by some lawmakers.
**Stage 2 — Market calibration (responding to current market prices Yes 26% / No 74%; volume high):**
- The market currently prices Yes at 26%, which is *lower* than my independent 38%. There are plausible explanations why the market is lower: - Traders may overweight political barriers to *any* invocation, treating Section 4's practical impossibility as dominating the entire event probability rather than splitting Section 3 vs Section 4. If market participants mentally equate "use" with an involuntary ouster, they undercount routine medical transfers. - Markets may reflect partisan-leaning priors and the expectation that a loyal VP and cabinet will not cooperate — again discounting Section 3 use for routine medical reasons. - Risk aversion and contract pricing frictions (large outstanding positions, skewed liquidity) can depress speculative probability of less-palatable outcomes.
- Why I think the market may be understating near-term risk: routine Section 3 uses are relatively common across presidencies and primarily medical rather than political events; these are easier to imagine and have an empirically observable base rate. Because the forecast horizon still contains multiple years and the subject is an older president, the base-rate for at least one short, documented transfer is materially above zero and arguably above what current prices imply.
- However, the market's lower price also contains reasonable information: many well-informed participants will rationally down-weight Section 4 because it is politically implausible with a loyal VP/Cabinet and would require extraordinary circumstances. If the president avoids any voluntary transfers and no acute medical emergency occurs, the market price will be correct. The market’s volume (140k contracts) suggests many informed views are already embedded; my 38% is a contrarian upward adjustment primarily due to explicit separation of Section 3 risk from Section 4 political constraints.
- Bottom line: I believe the market is *plausibly* underpricing the chance that the 25th Amendment will be used at least once because it conflates the politically remote Section 4 scenario with the more likely, routine Section 3 scenario. My independent probability is 38% and I view the market's 26% as a meaningful gap worth trading on only if transaction costs and position limits allow taking on that view.
Arguments
For
- Routine medical procedures are common for aging presidents; many modern presidents have used Section 3 for short transfers, so an at-least-once usage over ~2.5 years is plausible.
- The president's advanced age increases the base rate of events (procedures, sudden illness) that would trigger a Section 3 transfer or prompt concern.
- Public calls from lawmakers and enhanced legal scrutiny (updated guides, commentary) increase institutional attention and lower political friction for formal invocation in clear medical cases.
- An acute, unequivocal incapacitation (stroke, cardiac event) would create strong administrative incentives for VP and Cabinet to act quickly under Section 4 despite political costs.
Against
- Section 4 has never been used and requires VP + majority of principal officers plus potential supermajorities in Congress to lock it in — an extremely high political and procedural bar.
- The expected Vice President and many Cabinet members are likely to be loyal to the president, making an involuntary removal unlikely even if political rhetoric intensifies.
- The president could simply decline to use Section 3 for routine procedures and avoid any formal transfer of power, keeping the Amendment unused even during medical events that do not produce complete incapacity.
- Public and institutional reluctance to set a precedent of politically removing a president reduces the expected frequency of invoking the Amendment for non-clearcut cases.
Key drivers
- President's age and underlying health: raises baseline probability of procedures requiring brief incapacity.
- The distinction between Section 3 (voluntary) and Section 4 (involuntary) — different likelihoods and political dynamics.
- Composition and loyalty of the Vice President and Cabinet — critical to any Section 4 path.
- Political incentives and public pressure following crises (e.g., security incidents, clear cognitive/medical episode).
- Precedent and administrative practice — modern presidencies more likely to use Section 3 for routine procedures.
Risk factors
- Private medical information is not public; actual medical events could raise or lower probability rapidly.
- Rapid turnover in Cabinet or a disloyal VP could change Section 4 plausibility either up or down unexpectedly.
- The president could avoid voluntarily invoking Section 3 even for routine procedures, rejecting the formal process.
- Markets may be consolidating informed partisan traders who have superior inside knowledge of administration intentions.
- Legal/constitutional ambiguity around Section 4 timelines and procedures could deter institutional actors even when a medical reason exists.
Scenarios
Best case
A straightforward, well-documented Section 3 transfer occurs for a routine medical procedure (e.g., colonoscopy or similar) lasting a few hours. The transfer is procedural, uncontested, recorded in writing to Congress, and the presidency returns immediately afterward. This scenario generates a clean "Yes" with minimal political fallout.
Most likely
A narrow, routine Section 3 invocation for a short, planned medical procedure (or an uncontroversial short transfer) is the single most likely path to the Amendment being used. A politically motivated Section 4 invocation remains unlikely but is the primary source of tail risk.
Worst case
A contested medical or cognitive episode occurs that would arguably justify Section 4, but the VP and Cabinet refuse to act (or act too late) and Congress fails to reach the threshold to remove the president. The 25th Amendment remains unused despite a clear incapacitation, producing governance paralysis and constitutional crisis; outcome remains "No."
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