Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by end of May?
I assess a modest chance that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of 60+ transit calls for the Strait of Hormuz at least once by May 31, 2026, assigning a 30% probability driven by strong longer-term baseline traffic but limited time and elevated security uncertainty.
Analysis
Market-implied probability (Yes ~16%) reflects a common trader view that recovery to a 7-day moving average of 60+ transit calls is unlikely in the remaining days before May 31, and the market has substantial liquidity which suggests informed flow is already priced in. With only eight calendar days left (May 23–31 inclusive) there is a narrow window for any sustained rise in daily calls to move the 7-day average above 60, which requires several consecutive high daily counts or revisions to previously published values within the window.
Structurally, the Strait of Hormuz is normally one of the world’s busiest chokepoints and under baseline conditions the 7-day moving average would often be at or above the 60 threshold, so the core long-term tendency is toward the Yes outcome; that said, the requirement is for IMF Portwatch’s published counts which can reflect operational reporting delays, classification choices, and intra-period revisions (revisions published within the market timeframe are allowed and can create a last-minute qualifying value). The technicalities therefore favor a small possibility of late upward revisions or a short surge in visible transits producing a qualifying 7-day average.
On the downside, ongoing regional security risks (missile/drone attacks, seizures, naval escorts, or insurance-driven rerouting) can suppress visible transit calls quickly and keep the 7-day average depressed; such effects can persist for weeks and are hard to reverse on a short timeline. Conversely, coordinated de-escalation, increased naval protection, insurance improvements, or sudden restoration of commercial confidence could produce a rapid rebound in scheduled traffic—especially for tankers and container ships that cannot economically bypass the Strait—making a short sharp recovery plausible but not likely given the limited remaining days.
Weighing these elements I put moderate weight on mean reversion and data-revision mechanics (which raise the floor relative to the market price) but also substantial weight on the brevity of the time window and the persistence of security/insurance frictions; combining these leads to a ~30% probability that a qualifying 7-day moving average is published by May 31, 2026, with the remaining 70% reflecting the market’s and my judgment that traffic will remain below the threshold for the final published dates.
Arguments
For
- The Strait of Hormuz typically carries enough baseline traffic that the 7-day moving average often approaches or exceeds 60 under normal conditions.
- A short period of resumed commercial confidence or restored marine insurance coverage could quickly lift daily transit counts enough to push a 7-day average over 60.
- Multinational naval escorts or visible de-escalation measures can produce rapid operational normalization and encourage immediate transits.
- IMF Portwatch allows revisions published within the market timeframe, creating a pathway for late upward adjustments to qualify.
- Some shipping categories (tankers, container) have limited economically viable alternatives, increasing likelihood of a quick return once risk premium declines.
Against
- Only eight days remain, making it difficult for a sustained seven-day run of high daily counts to both occur and be reported in time.
- If recent weeks have seen suppressed counts because of security or insurance issues, the 7-day average will be slow to recover even if daily calls rebound.
- Persistent or renewed regional incidents would keep operators cautious and maintain lower visible transit numbers.
- Carriers and charterers can choose to reroute or delay movements for reasons beyond immediate security improvements, slowing any rebound.
- IMF Portwatch may report data with delays or classification differences that undercount certain movements compared with operational reality.
- Market participants have likely already priced in the highest-probability paths to recovery, limiting upside from new information.
Key drivers
- Baseline commercial necessity for Gulf exports which normally produces high transit volumes through the Strait.
- Recent level of regional security incidents that either deter transits or require convoys and rerouting.
- Insurance premiums and operators’ voyage decisions which can instantly reduce visible portwatch counts.
- Naval protection or multinational escort operations which can restore commercial confidence quickly.
- IMF Portwatch reporting cadence, classification, and the possibility of intra-period revisions upward.
- Seasonal and demand factors for oil and bulk commodities that materially affect tanker and cargo schedules.
Risk factors
- A continued or escalated spike in attacks or seizures that keeps traffic suppressed through the end of May.
- Persistently elevated war-risk or hull insurance premiums that deter commercial transits despite security escorts.
- Delays or gaps in IMF Portwatch reporting that obscure actual transit rises before the cutoff date.
- Structural rerouting decisions by carriers that shift flows away from the Strait for an extended period.
- A sudden market shock (e.g., new sanctions or major port closures) that reduces exports and transits.
- Overreliance on the possibility of post-publication revisions which are disallowed if after May 31.
Scenarios
Best case
Rapid de-escalation, an announced multinational escort initiative, or a large number of previously unreported transits being revised upward by IMF Portwatch produces several consecutive high daily counts and/or a revision such that the 7-day moving average reaches or exceeds 60 at least once before May 31, leading to resolution as Yes.
Most likely
Modest improvement or small fluctuations in traffic occur but are insufficiently sustained to boost the 7-day moving average above 60 within the limited remaining window, and no qualifying upward revisions are published in time, resulting in a No resolution.
Worst case
Security incidents continue or intensify, insurance costs remain elevated, and carriers keep rerouting or canceling passages, so that daily visible transit calls stay low and no 7-day average meets the 60 threshold, producing a clear No resolution by the May 31 data publication.
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